This paper offers an introduction to Bayesian reference analysis, often regarded as the more successful method to produce non-subjective, model-based, posterior distributions. The ideas are illustrated with an interesting problem, the ratio of multinomial parameters, for which no model-based Bayesian analysis has been proposed. Signposts are provided to the huge related literature.
INTRODUCTION
From a Bayesian perspective, the outcome of any inference problem is the posterior distribution of the quantity of interest, which combines the information provided by the data with available prior information; it has been often recognised that there is a pragmatically important need for a form of prior to posterior analysis which captures, in a well-defined sense, the notion that the prior should have a minimal effect, relative to the data, on the posterior inference. We will generally denote by π(φ | x) a model-based, non-subjective posterior density of a quantity of interest φ conditional on data x, for which a probability model p(x | φ, λ) is assumed which may also depend on a vector λ = {λ 1 , . . . , λ m } of nuisance parameters.
In the long, fascinating history of the quest for these "baseline" posterior distributions, a number of requirements have emerged which may reasonably be regarded as necessary properties of an algorithm designed to produce such non-subjective posteriors: (i) Invariance with respect to one-to-one transformations. (Jeffreys, 1946; Jaynes, 1968; Kass, 1989; Dawid, 1983; Yang, 1995; Datta and Ghosh, 1996) . The posterior π(φ | x) with respect to model p(x | φ) must be consistent with the posterior π(θ | x) with respect to p(x | θ), where θ = θ(φ) is a one-to-one function of φ, so that, for all x,
(ii) No marginalization paradoxes. (Stone and Dawid, 1972; Dawid, Stone and Zidek, 1973) . If the posterior π 1 (φ | x) for the quantity of interest φ conditional to data x from model p(x | φ, λ) is of the form π 1 (φ | x) = π 1 (φ | t), and if the sampling distribution of t, p(t | φ, λ) = p(t | φ) only depends on φ, then the posterior of φ, π 2 (φ | t), obtained from the simplified model p(t | φ) must be the same as the posterior π 1 (φ | t) obtained from the full model p(x | φ, λ). (iii) Consistent sampling properties. (Neyman and Scott, 1948 , Stein, 1959 , 1962 Welch and Peers, 1963; Peers, 1965; Stone, 1976; Fraser, Monette and Ng, 1985; Tibshirani, 1989; . The properties under repeated sampling of the posterior distribution, should be consistent with the model. In particular, for any large sample size and for any 0 < p < 1, the coverage probability of a credible interval with non-subjective posterior probability p should be close to p for most parameter values.
Besides those technical requirements, methods proposed to derive non-subjective posterior distributions should be general, i.e., applicable to any properly defined inference problem, and "admissible" in the sense that, for each known example, no other model-based posterior could be argued to be "better" in a generally accepted, well-defined sense.
The reference analysis, introduced by Bernardo (1979 Bernardo ( , 1981 and further developed by , 1992a , 1992b , 1992c ) is, to the best of our knowledge, the only available method to derive non-subjective posterior distributions which satisfy all those desiderata. However, reference posterior distributions have a reputation of being difficult to obtain, and the professional literature often contains formal Bayesian analysis using unjustified and often misleading, (but easily derived!), naïve "noninformative" priors. This may be partially due to the lack of an easily accessible introduction to reference analysis; in this paper, we try to offer such an introduction.
Section 2 contains an overview of reference analysis, where the definition is motivated, heuristic derivations of explicit expressions for the one parameter, two parameters, and multiparameter cases are sequentially presented, and the behaviour of the reference posteriors under repeated sampling is discussed. In Section 3, the theory is applied to an inference problem, the ratio of multinomial parameters, for which no model-based Bayesian analysis has been previously proposed, and which has been chosen because it combines intrinsic importance and pedagogic value. Section 4 includes further discussion and provides directions for complementary reading. A number of definite integral results required in Section 3 are collected together in a final appendix.
AN OVERVIEW OF REFERENCE ANALYSIS 2.1. Motivation
The declared objective of reference Bayesian analysis is to specify a prior distribution such that, even for moderate sample sizes, the information provided by the data should dominate the prior information because of the "vague" nature of the prior knowledge. Reference analysis uses the concept of statistical information, in the technical sense of Shannon (1948) and Lindley (1956) , to make this notion precise; see Soofi (1994) for a recent discussion of these ideas. The amount of information to be expected from an experiment about some quantity of interest naturally depends on the available prior knowledge: the more prior information available, the less information may be expected to be learned from the data. An infinitely large experiment would eventually provide all missing information; thus, it is possible to obtain a measure of the amount of missing information as a limiting form of a functional of the prior distribution. It is natural to define "vague" prior knowledge as that with the largest missing information: the reference prior should then be that which maximizes the missing information.
Actually, due to the fact that the missing information is defined as a limit which is not necessarily finite, the reference prior is defined as some special limit of a sequence of prior distributions which maximize the information to be expected from an increasingly large experiment; we now make this formulation precise.
One Parameter
Given an experiment e which consists of one observation x from p(x | φ), φ ∈ Φ ⊂ , the amount of information I{e, p(φ)} which may be expected about φ when prior knowledge is described by p(φ) is defined by
hence, the amount of information which may be expected from k independent replications of e,
As k → ∞, e(k) would provide any missing information about φ which could be obtained within this framework, and hence, as k → ∞, I{e(k), p(φ)} will approach the missing information about φ when prior knowledge is described by p(φ). It would be natural for a non-subjective prior intended to describe "lack of knowledge" about a quantity φ to maximize the missing information about its value: the reference prior would then be a special type of limit, as k → ∞, of a sequence of priors π k (φ) which maximize I{e(k), p(φ)} within the class of strictly positive priors on Φ. The amount of information I{e(k), p(φ)} may usefully be reexpressed as
and, using a calculus of variations argument, it is easily verified that this is maximized if, and only if, the prior p(φ) is such that p(φ) ∝ f k (φ). However, for each k, this only provides an implicit solution for the prior which maximizes I{e(k), p(φ)}, since f k (φ) depends on the prior through the posterior distribution p(φ | z k ); moreover, the maximizing prior is typically discrete, even for continuous parameters (Berger, Bernardo and Mendoza, 1989) . To overcome both difficulties, consider, for large k, an asymptotic approximation to the posterior distribution, say q(φ | z k ), which may certainly be chosen to be independent of p(φ). Then, under suitable regularity conditions, the sequence of positive functions
derived from such an asymptotic posterior may be expected to induce, by formal use of Bayes theorem, a sequence of posterior distributions
with the desired reference posterior distribution π(φ | x) as its limit, so that
where the limit is to be understood in the information sense, i.e., such that, for almost all x,
For a discussion of the necessity of this type of limit, see the analysis of the confidence paradox of Monette, Fraser and Ng (1985) , in Berger and Bernardo (1992c) . The limiting distribution (2) is defined to be the reference posterior distribution of φ. A reference prior is a function which, for any data, makes it possible to obtain the reference posterior π(φ | x) by formal use of Bayes theorem, i.e., a positive function π(φ) such that, for all x ∈ X,
Thus the reference prior π(φ) is the limit of the sequence {π k (φ), k = 1, 2, . . .} defined by (1) in the precise sense that the information-type limit of the corresponding sequence of posterior distributions {π k (φ | x), k = 1, 2, . . .} is the posterior obtained from π(φ) by formal use of Bayes theorem. Very often, the asymptotic posterior distribution q(φ | z k ) only depends on the data through some asymptotically sufficient, consistent estimatorφ. In such case, the sequence (1) may be reexpressed as
In particular, if q(φ|φ) = N(φ|φ, d(φ)) so that the posterior distribution of φ is asymptotically normal with meanφ and standard deviation d(φ), then
Summarizing, we may state: 
It is well known that under regularity conditions, the posterior distribution is asymptotically normal with standard deviation f (φ) −1/2 , where
is Fisher's function. In this case, the reference prior is
i.e., Jeffreys (1946 Jeffreys ( , 1961 prior; Polson (1992) discusses in detail the necessary regularity conditions; Ghosal (1996) analyses the non-regular case. It follows that the reference prior algorithm contains Jeffreys' prior as the particular case which obtains under normal asymptotics in one-parameter continuous models. Proposition 1 may be used to derive reference posteriors associated to models which only depend on the quantity of interest. As one should require, if the model is otherwise parametrized in terms of some one-to-one function θ = θ(φ) of the quantity of interest, the reference posterior of φ may consistently be obtained from that of θ. Indeed,
We now consider models which contain nuisance parameters; it turns out that those may be handled by recursively using the one-parameter solution.
One Nuisance Parameter
Suppose that we are interested in the value of φ, given a random sample {x 1 , . . . ,
which contains a nuisance parameter λ. Note that we allow for the possibility that the nuisance parameter space Λ(φ) may depend on φ. Working conditionally on φ, this is a one-parameter problem and, hence, the one-parameter solution described above may be used to obtain a conditional reference prior π(λ | φ). If this is proper, then it may be used to integrate out the nuisance parameter λ and obtain a model p(x | φ) which only depends on φ, thereby reducing the problem to one already solved.
If the conditional reference prior π(λ | φ) is not proper, then the procedure is performed within an increasing sequence of bounded approximations {Λ i , i = 1, 2, . . .} to the nuisance parameter space Λ, chosen such that π(λ | φ) is integrable within each of them. The reference posterior π(φ | x) is then obtained as the limit of the resulting sequence {π i (φ | x), i = 1, 2, . . .} of restricted reference posteriors.
We shall only consider here the regular case, where joint posterior asymptotic normality may be established. Let F (φ, λ) be the corresponding 2 × 2 Fisher's matrix in terms of φ and λ, and let S(φ, λ) = F −1 (φ, λ), so that the posterior distribution of (φ, λ) is asymptotically normal with mean (φ,λ), the corresponding mle's, and covariance matrix S(φ,λ). It follows that: (i) the marginal posterior distribution of φ is asymptotically normal with standard deviation d 0 (φ,λ) = s 1,1 (φ,λ) 1/2 ; (ii) the conditional posterior distribution of λ given φ is asymptotically normal with standard deviation
Working conditionally on φ, so that λ is the only relevant parameter, and using Proposition 1,
provided the integral exists. If it does not, an approximating sequence is
where
.} is an increasing sequence of compact approximations to Λ(φ).
The sequence of priors (1) may then be computed as
and therefore, substituting and changing the order of integration,
But the inner double integral converges to
since q(φ |φ,λ) is normal with meanφ and standard deviation d
0 (φ,λ) and, therefore,
is not proper, one would similarly obtain the approximating sequence
Thus, we have:
be a probability model with two real-valued parameters φ and λ, where φ is the quantity of interest, and suppose that the joint posterior distribution of (φ, λ) is asymptotically normal with covariance matrix
where the marginal reference prior of φ is
is required, and the reference posterior distribution of φ is obtained as
It is often found in applications that the nuisance parameter space Λ(φ) = Λ is independent of φ, and that the functions d 0 and d 1 nicely factorize in the form d
if this is the case, then, for some positive constant c i , we have
and hence, π i (φ) = π(φ) ∝ a 0 (φ). Thus, we have,
Corollary. If the nuisance parameter space Λ(φ) = Λ is independent of φ, and the functions d 0 and d 1 factorize in the form
and there is no need for compact approximation, even if the conditional reference priors are not proper.
The Multiparameter Case
Proposition 2 and its corollary may easily be extended to any number of nuisance parameters. Indeed, if the model is p(x | φ, λ 1 , . . . , λ m ), the quantity of interest is φ, the appropriate regularity conditions hold, and F (φ, λ 1 , . . . , λ m ) is the corresponding (m + 1) × (m + 1) Fisher's matrix, then the posterior distribution of (φ, λ 1 , . . . , λ m ) is asymptotically normal with mean (φ,λ 1 , . . . ,λ m ), the corresponding mle's, and covariance matrix S(φ,λ 1 , . . . ,λ m ), where
, then (i) the marginal posterior distribution of φ is asymptotically normal with standard deviation
(ii) the conditional posterior distribution of λ i given φ, λ 1 , . . . , λ i−1 , is asymptotically normal with standard deviation
and one may sequentially use the algorithm described in 2.
, and π(φ), and produce the desired reference posterior. 
where dλ j = dλ j × · · · × dλ m , and
. . , m are all proper. If any of those conditional reference priors is not proper, then a compact approximation is required for the corresponding integrals.
(ii) The marginal reference prior of φ is
After data {x 1 , . . . , x n } have been observed, the reference posterior distribution of the parameter of interest φ, is
Corollary If the nuisance parameter spaces 
. . , m and there is no need for compact approximations, even if the π(λ i
| φ, λ 1 , . . . , λ i−1 )'s are not proper.
Behaviour under repeated sampling
The frequentist coverage probabilities of credible intervals derived from reference posterior distributions are sometimes identical, and usually very close, to their posterior probabilities; this means that even for moderate samples, an interval with reference posterior probability 1−α may often be interpreted as an approximate confidence interval with significance level α. More formally, if t α = t α (x 1 , . . . , x n ) denotes the 1 − α quantile which corresponds to the reference posterior π(φ | x 1 , . . . , x n ), so that
then the coverage probability of the
while, for most priors, this asymptotic approximation is only O(n −1/2 ). Intuitively, this says that the reference prior is often a probability matching prior, i.e., a prior for which the coverage probabilities of one-sided posterior credible intervals are asymptotically as close as possible to their posterior probabilities. Hartigan (1966) showed that the coverage probabilities of twosided Bayesian posterior credible intervals satisfy this type of approximation to O(n −1 ) for all priors.
In a pioneering paper, Welch and Peers (1963) established that in the case of the oneparameter regular continuous models Jeffreys' prior, -which in this case (Proposition 1) is also the reference prior-, is the only probability matching prior. Hartigan (1983, p. 79) showed that this result may be extended to one-parameter discrete models by using continuity corrections. derived a differential equation which provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a prior to be probability matching in the multiparameter continuous regular case; this has been used to verify that reference priors are typically probability matching priors. Recent work by Rousseau (1996) using continuity corrections, suggests that these results may also be extended to multiparameter discrete models. In Section 4, we summarize some additional related work.
Although the results described above only justify an asymptotic approximate frequentist interpretation of reference posterior probabilities, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the coverage probabilities of reference posterior credible intervals derived from relatively small samples are also typically close to their posterior probabilities; this will be illustrated in the example discussed below.
THE RATIO OF MULTINOMIAL PARAMETERS 3.1. The Problem
Consider n multinomial observations which belong to one of, say, m + 1 categories, so that
Suppose that we are interested in the ratio of the, say, first two parameters φ = θ 1 /θ 2 . For instance, in an insurance application one may be interested in assessing how many times more likely is risk 1 than risk 2 or, in a political application, one may be interested in assessing the ratio of the percentages of votes that candidates 1 and 2 may be expected to obtain.
We note that, in the absence of other information, one would expect the result to depend on r 1 and r 2 , but not on n or the other r i 's, which intuition suggest should be irrelevant; indeed, in the absence of information on the relationship among the θ i 's, we cannot expect to obtain information about θ 1 /θ 2 from the n − r 1 − r 2 observations which do not belong to either of the first two categories.
The Two Parameters Case
Let us first consider the two parameter case, so that there are three categories, with probabilities θ 1 , θ 2 and 1 − θ 1 − θ 2 , and
or, in terms of φ = θ 1 /θ 2 , and λ = θ 2 ,
The corresponding Fisher's matrix is easily found to be
hence, the joint posterior of (φ, λ) is asymptotically normal with covariance matrix S(φ,λ) and, therefore, (i) the marginal asymptotic posterior of φ is normal with standard deviation d 0 (φ,λ),
(ii) the conditional asymptotic posterior of λ given φ is normal with standard deviation d 1 (φ,λ),
since the factor (1 + φ) 1/2 cancels out and
thus, using Proposition A1, with a = b = 1/2, and c = 1 + φ, the conditional reference prior of the nuisance parameter λ given the parameter of interest φ is
which is a proper, Beta-like, distribution on the interval
From Proposition 2 (ii),
and, using Proposition A2 with a = b = 1/2 and c = 1 + φ, one has
finally , using Proposition A4 with a = b = 1/2,
and, hence, the marginal reference prior of the parameter of interest φ, which is proper even though it is defined on the unbounded space Φ =]0, ∞[, is given by
Combining (3) and (4), the joint reference prior needed to obtain a reference posterior for the parameter of interest φ is the proper prior
therefore, using (5) in Bayes theorem to derive the corresponding joint posterior and integrating out the nuisance parameter λ, the reference posterior for the parameter of interest is
Using Proposition A1 with a = r 1 + r 2 + 1/2, b = n − r 1 − r 2 + 1/2 and c = 1 + φ to solve the last integral, we have
(1 + φ) r 1 +r 2 +1
, and, using Proposition A4 with a = r 1 + 1/2 and b = r 2 + 1/2 to obtain the proportionality constant, we finally obtain the desired reference posterior distribution of the quantity of interest φ, as the Beta distribution of the second kind (see e.g., Johnson et al. , 1995, p. 248) π(φ | r 1 , r 2 , n) = π(φ | r 1 , r 2 ) = Γ(r 1 + r 2 + 1) Γ(r 1 + 1/2)Γ(r 2 + 1/2)
Since (6) has been derived from a proper prior, it is obviously proper for any data. Moreover, as expected, it does not depend on n, but only on r 1 and r 2 : the n − r 1 − r 2 observations which belong to the third category do not directly provide any information on the value of φ = θ 1 /θ 2 . In the particular case where r 1 = r 2 = 0, so that all n observations belong to the third category, we do not have any information about φ = θ 1 /θ 2 and hence, the reference posterior distribution reduces to the marginal reference prior (4), shown in Figure 1 , which has no expected value, but a median equal to 1, thus making equally likely θ 1 > θ 2 than θ 2 > θ 1 .
It is easily checked that, when r 1 ≥ 1, π(φ | r 1 , r 2 ) has a mode at (r 1 − 1/2)/(r 2 + 3/2). Moreover, if one further defines
and hence φ = ω/(1 − ω), one has
and, therefore, π(w | r 1 , r 2 ) = Be(w | r 1 + 1/2, r 2 + 1/2).
Thus the reference posterior for φ is equivalent to ω, the proportion of observed elements in category 1 among those in either category 1 or category 2, having the conventional Jeffreys-like reference posterior Be(ω | r 1 + 1/2, r 2 + 1/2). This may be used to obtain credible regions for φ using the typically preprogrammed incomplete Beta routines. Figure 2 shows the reference posterior distributions of φ obtained from three simulated samples of size n = 5, n = 20 and n = 100 from a multinomial model with θ 1 = 0.4 and θ 2 = 0.5, so that the true value of the quantity of interest is θ 1 /θ 2 = 4/5.
The General Case
Let us now consider the general case, so that there are m + 1 categories with probabilities θ 1 , . . . , θ m and 1 − 
Since we are interested in φ = θ 1 /θ 2 , we make the one-to-one transformation
The Jacobian of the inverse transformation θ 1 = φλ, θ 2 = λ, θ i = θ i , i = 3, . . . , m is then
and, therefore, the posterior distribution of (φ, λ, θ 3 , . . . , θ m ) is asymptotically normal with covariance matrix n −1 S(φ,λ,θ 3 , . . . ,θ m ), whereφ = r 1 /r 2 ,λ = r 2 /n, andθ i = r i /n, i = 3, . . . , m are the corresponding mle's, and
(see Mendoza, 1994, or Bernardo and Smith, 1994, p. 295) . After some algebra, one finds
where θ * m = θ 3 + · · · + θ m , and
With the notation of Proposition 3, and using the recursive structure of (7) and (8), we find that
for those θ m values such that 0 < θ 1 + θ 2 + . . . + θ m ≤ 1 and, therefore, such that
where c = 1−λ(1+φ)−δ m . Using Proposition A3 with a = b = 1/2, and c = 1−λ(1+φ)−δ m ,
and, hence,
Moreover, S 2 , the upper 2 × 2 submatrix of S(φ, λ, θ 3 , . . . , θ m ), equals the matrix S(φ, λ) obtained in two parameter case and, hence, the same results obtain, namely,
Thus, the joint reference prior required to obtain the reference posterior of the quantity of interest φ is
Using Bayes theorem with this joint prior and integrating out the nuisance parameters λ, θ 3 , . . . , θ m , the desired reference posterior may be derived as
where r m+1 = n − m j=1 r j , and c j = 1 − λ(1 + φ) − δ j . Using Proposition A3 with a = 1/2, b = r m+1 + 1/2 and c = c m , the last integral is proportional to (1 − λ(1 + φ) − δ m ) r m+1 and, therefore,
thus, using Proposition A3 repeatedly,
Finally, using Proposition A1 with a = r 1 + r 2 + 1/2, b = r m+1 + 1/2, and c = 1 + φ, we have
as in the two parameter case, so that
Thus, as we anticipated on intuitive grounds, reference inferences about θ 1 /θ 2 only depend on r 1 and r 2 ; the number and distribution among the other categories of the remaining n − r 1 − r 2 observations -and, more importantly, the essentially arbitrary number m of considered categories-, are all irrelevant for inferences solely based on the multinomial model. It is easily verified that this is not true if conventional "noninformative" priors, such as a uniform prior, or Jeffreys' multivariate prior, are used instead of (9) in deriving a model-based posterior for φ.
Coverage Probabilities
The joint reference prior (9) satisfies conditions for probability matching in continuous multiparameter models; indeed, after some algebra, it is found that
is given by (8), and π(θ) is given by (9). Extending Hartigan (1983) results with the techniques developed by Rousseau (1996) , this suggests that, asymptotically, the continuity corrected coverage probabilities of one-sided credible intervals for φ of posterior probability p are equal to p to order n −1 . Table 1 . Observed coverages of one-sided reference intervals for φ with posterior probability p.
Mean and standard deviations of five runs of 10000 simulations, for several sample sizes. To analyze the coverage probabilities obtained for finite samples, we simulated 10000 samples {r i1 , r i2 } of sizes n = 10, n = 25 and n = 100 from a multinomial distribution with θ 1 = 0.1, θ 2 = 0.3 (and therefore φ = 1/3), and other 10000 samples of the same sizes from a multinomial distribution with θ 1 = 0.6, θ 2 = 0.2 (and therefore, φ = 3). In both cases, the quantiles q i p , for p = 0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.95, and i = 1, . . . , 10000 were computed for each sample, so that
and, for each sample, we verified whether or not the p-credible interval [0, q i p ] contained the true value of φ, and thus computed the observed proportion of coverages. The whole procedure was replicated five times. In Table 1 we reproduce, for selected quantiles, the mean and standard deviation of the five observed coverages. In Figure 3 we offer a graphical presentation of the results, where the mean of the five observed coverages, and the bands obtained plus and minus two standard deviations, have been plotted against the corresponding reference posterior probabilities. It may be observed that even with rather moderate sample sizes, the reference posterior probabilities are not appreciably different from their observed coverages; as a matter of fact, the average coverage pattern is very much the same for the three sample sizes considered. This suggests that, even for moderate sample sizes, posterior reference intervals of φ are well calibrated, in the sense that if many samples of were to be taken from a given multinomial model, the corresponding reference intervals for φ with posterior probability p would contain the true value of φ with a relative frequency very close to p.
Numerical Example
In an expensive experiment designed to study possible improvements on the design of a new airbag, a random sample of 1200 airbags were destructively tested and 38 of them were found to be defective. The engineers found five different failure causes, which respectively accounted for 15, 12, 6, 3 and 2 of these failures, and judged them to be independent from each other. Moreover, it was decided that the optimal allocation of the resources available to improve the design crucially depended on the ratio of the probabilities of failure associated to the two most frequent causes of failure. Thus, with the notation above, one had m = 5, n = 1200, r 1 = 15, r 2 = 12, r 3 = 6, r 4 = 3, r 5 = 2, and φ = θ 1 /θ 2 is the quantity of interest.
Using (10), the reference posterior distribution of such quantity of interest is
shown in Figure 4 , which does not depend on the total sample size 1200 or on the number, m = 5 of categories considered, or on the number or distribution of the failures which are not either of type 1 or type 2. The reference posterior has a mode at 14.5/13.5 = 1.074; transforming to w = φ/(1 + φ) and using the incomplete Beta function, one easily finds that the median is 1.247 and that, for instance,
Thus, given the results of the experiment, one may for instance report that type 1 is quite likely the more frequent cause of failure, and that it is probably about 1.25 times more likely than type 2, but surely less than 3 times more likely.
More formally, if a decision problem is contemplated with a utility structure of the form u (d i , φ) , then the optimal action may be found by maximizing
where π(φ | data) is given by (11).
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER REFERENCES
In this paper, we have summarized the motivation, definition, and derivation of reference posterior distributions, we have illustrated the theory with an important example, and we have mentioned, -without proof-, some of the properties which may be used to substantiate the claim that they constitute the more promising available method to derive non-subjective prior distributions. However, the definition and possible uses of non-subjective priors, which under this and many other labels, -such as "conventional, "default", "formal", "neutral", "flat" or "noninformative" -, are intended to provide Bayesian solutions which do not require to assess a subjective prior, have always been a rather polemic issue among statisticians. In this final section, we summarize some of the elements of the discussion, and provide signposts for those interested in pursuing the subject at a deeper level.
Interpretation of Non-subjective Priors
A major criticism to the use of non-subjective priors comes from subjectivist Bayesians, who argue that the prior should be an honest expression of the analyst's prior knowledge and not a function of the model, specially if this involves integration over the sample space and hence may violate the likelihood principle. However, from a foundational viewpoint, the derivation of a reference posterior should be seen as part of a healthy sensitivity analysis, where it is desired to analyze the changes in the posterior of interest induced by changes in the prior: a reference posterior is just an answer to a what if question, namely what could be said about the quantity of interest given the data, if one's prior knowledge were dominated by the data. If the experiment is changed the reference prior may be expected to change correspondingly; if subjective prior information is specified, the corresponding posterior could be compared with the reference posterior in order to assess the relative importance on the initial opinions in the final inference. Moreover, from a pragmatic point of view, it must be stressed that in the Bayesian analysis of the complex multiparameter models which are now systematically used as a consequence of the availability of numerical MCMC methods, -models typically intractable from a frequentist perspective-, there is little hope for a detailed assessment of a huge personal multivariate prior; the naïve use of some tractable "noninformative" prior may then hide important unwarranted assumptions which may easily dominate the analysis (see e.g., Casella, 1996 , and references therein). Careful, responsible choice of a non-subjective prior is then possibly the best available alternative.
It should also be mentioned here that some Bayesian statisticians would follow Jeffreys (1961) or Jaynes (1996) in a radical non-subjective view: they would claim that subjective priors are useless for scientific inference and so, non-subjective priors are necessary because there is nothing else to do.
Improper Priors
The reference priors that we have obtained in this paper have always been proper probability distributions; thus,
However, non-subjective priors associated to models with unbounded parameter spaces, -certainly including reference priors-, are typically improper in that, in most cases, if Φ is not compact, then Φ π(φ) dφ = ∞. This has often been criticized on the grounds that (i) foundational arguments require the use of a proper prior, and (ii) the use of improper priors may lead to unsatisfactory posteriors. With respect to the foundational issue, we should point out that the natural axioms do not imply that the prior must be proper: they only lead to finite additivity, which is compatible with improper measures. However, the further natural assumption of conglomerability leads to σ-additivity and, hence, to proper measures; some signposts to this interesting debate are Sudderth (1978, 1989) , Hartigan (1983) , Cifarelli and Regazzini (1987) , Seidenfeld (1987) , Consonni and Veronese (1989) and Lindley (1996) . It must be stressed however that, by definition, non-subjective priors are not intended to describe personal beliefs: they are only positive functions to be formally used in Bayes theorem to obtain non-subjective posteriors, -which indeed should always be proper given a minimum sample size-. Uncritical use of a "noninformative" prior may lead to an improper posterior (see e.g., Berger, 1985, p. 187 , for a well known example); the precise conditions for an improper prior to lead to a proper posterior are not known, but we are not aware of any example where the reference algorithm has lead to an improper posterior given a sample of minimum size. Moreover, non-subjective posteriors should be expressible as a limit of some sequence of posteriors derived from proper priors (Stein, 1965) ; this is precisely the procedure used to define reference distributions.
Finally, it is very important to emphasize that the use of a proper prior does certainly not guarantee a sensible behaviour of the resulting posterior. Indeed, if an improper prior leads to a posterior with undesirable properties, the posterior which would result from a proper approximation to that prior, -say that obtained by truncation of the parameter space-, will still have the same undesirable properties; for instance, the posterior of the sum of the squares of normal means φ = m j=1 µ 2 j based on a joint uniform prior on the means π(µ 1 , . . . , µ m ) ∝ 1 is extremely unsatisfactory as a non-subjective posterior (Stein, 1959) , but so it is the posterior of φ based on the proper multinormal prior π(µ 1 , . . . , µ m ) ∝ i N(µ i |0, σ), for large σ. Proper or improper, what must pragmatically be required from non-subjective priors is that, for any data set, they lead to sensible, data dominated, posterior distributions.
Calibration
Non-subjective posterior credible intervals are often numerically very close, and sometimes identical, to frequentist confidence intervals based on sufficient statistics (for an instructive discussion of how unsatisfactory confidence intervals may be when not based on sufficient statistics see Jaynes, 1976) . Indeed, the analysis on the frequentist coverage probabilities of credible intervals derived from non-subjective posteriors, -in an attempt to verify whether or not they are "well calibrated -, has a very long history, and it does provide some bridges between frequentist and Bayesian inference. References within this topic include Lindley (1958) , Welch and Peers (1963) , Bartholomew (1965) , Peers (1965 Peers ( , 1968 , Welch (1965) , Hartigan (1966 Hartigan ( , 1983 , DeGroot (1973) , Robinson (1975 Robinson ( , 1978 , Rubin (1984) , Stein (1985) , Chang and Villegas (1986) , Tibshirani (1989) , Dawid (1991) , Severini (1991 Severini ( , 1993 Severini ( , 1994 , Mukerjee (1992, 1993) , Efron (1993) , Mukerjee and Day (1993) , Nicolau (1993) , DiCiccio and Stern (1994) , Samaniego and Reneau (1994) , and Datta (1996) . This is a very active research area; indeed, the frequentist coverage probabilities of posterior credible intervals have often been an important element in arguing among competing nonsubjective posteriors, as in Stein (1985) , Efron (1986) , Tibshirani (1989) , , Ye and Berger (1991) , Liseo (1993) , Berger and Yang (1994) , Yang and Berger (1994) , Ghosh, Carlin and Srivastava (1995) and Sun and Ye (1995) . Reference posteriors have consistently been found to have very attractive coverage properties, even for small samples, but no general results have been established.
Further Signposts
The classic books by Jeffreys (1961) , Lindley (1965) and Box and Tiao (1973) are a must for anyone interested in non-subjective Bayesian inference; they prove that most "textbook" inference problems have a simple non-subjective Bayesian solution, and one which produces credible intervals which are often, numerically, either identical or very close to their frequentist "accepted" counterparts, but much easier to obtain. Zellner (1971) is a textbook on econometrics from a non-subjective Bayesian viewpoint; Geisser (1993) summarizes many results on nonsubjective posterior predictive distributions.
The construction of non-subjective posterior distributions has a very interesting history, which dates back to Laplace (1812) , and includes Jeffreys (1946 Jeffreys ( , 1961 , Perks (1947) , Lindley (1961) , Geisser and Cornfield (1963) , Welch and Peers (1963) , Hartigan (1964 Hartigan ( , 1965 , Novick and Hall (1965) , Jaynes (1968 Jaynes ( , 1971 , Good (1969) , DeGroot (1970, Ch. 10) , Villegas (1971 Villegas ( , 1977 Villegas ( , 1981 Box and Tiao (1973, Sec. 1.3) , Zellner (1977 Zellner ( , 1986 , Akaike (1978) , Bernardo (1979) , Geisser (1979 Geisser ( , 1984 , Rissanen (1983) , Tibshirani (1989) and Berger and Bernardo (1989, 1992c) as some of the more influential contributions. The development of this long quest may conveniently be traced from Bernardo and Smith (1994, Sec. 5.6 .2), Kass and Wasserman (1996) , and references therein.
Some recent developments include Ghosh and Mukerjee (1992) , Mukerjee and Dey (1993) , Clarke and Wasserman (1993) , George and McCulloch (1993) , Clarke and Barron (1994) , Wasserman and Clarke (1995) , , 1995c and Zellner (1996) . Yang and Berger (1996) is a partial catalog, alphabetically ordered by probability model, of many non-subjective priors which have been suggested in the literature. Bernardo (1997) is a non technical analysis, in a dialog format, on the foundational issues involved, and it is followed by a discussion.
For someone specifically interested in reference distributions, the original paper, Bernardo (1979) , is easily read and it is followed by a very lively discussion; Bernardo (1981) extends the theory to general decision problems; Berger and Bernardo (1989, 1992c) contain crucial mathematical extensions. A textbook level description of reference analysis is provided in Bernardo and Smith (1994, Sec. 5.4) .
Papers which contain explicit analysis of specific reference distributions include Bernardo (1977 Bernardo ( , 1978 Bernardo ( , 1979 Bernardo ( , 1980 Bernardo ( , 1982 Bernardo ( , 1985 , Bayarri (1981 Bayarri ( , 1985 , Ferrándiz (1982 Ferrándiz ( , 1985 , Sendra (1982) , Eaves (1983a Eaves ( , 1983b Eaves ( , 1985 , Bernardo and Bayarri (1985) , Chang and Villegas (1986) , Hills (1987) , Mendoza (1987 Mendoza ( , 1988 , Bernardo and Girón (1988) , Lindley (1988) , , 1992a , 1992b , 1992c , Pole and West (1989) , Chang and Eaves (1990) , Polson and Wasserman (1990) , Ye and Berger (1991) , Stephens and Smith (1992) , Liseo (1993) , Ye
